Brad DeLong and David Corn have questions for Condi. From DeLong:

Q: You have stated that in the summer of 2001 the Bush administration was at "battle stations". When the Clinton administration was at battle stations in the run-up to January 1, 2000, the NSC staff led by Richard Clarke shook the trees by having daily cabinet-level meetings on the terrorist threat, and demanding that cabinet officers probe deeply into their organizations looking for important but unrecognized information. There was no corresponding effort in the summer of 2001, was there?

Follow Up Q: When you say that the Bush administration was at "battle stations" before 911, aren't you misleading people who know what Richard Clarke's idea of "battle stations" is?

Follow Up Q: Do you regret not giving Richard Clarke the authority in the summer of 2001 to do what he wanted to do--to "shake the trees" of the departments in an attempt to uncover information of unrecognized importance?

And of course,

Q: Why does George W. Bush believe that Saddam Hussein played a role in the attacks of September 11, 2001?

Follow Up Q: Did you attempt to disabuse George W. Bush of this belief?

Follow Up Q: Why not?

And the first couple questions from Corn, dealing with the pre-9/11 warnings about bin Laden:

1) In May 2002, the public learned through news reports -- not your administration -- that on Aug. 6, 2001, the president received a President's Daily Briefing (PDB) that made reference to the threat from Osama bin Laden. You told reporters that this PDB was a short and vague "analytic report," not a "warning," and mainly covered routine and historical information on bin Laden, noting that he might be interested in hijacking an airplane to gain the release of one of his operatives. Yet the final report on 9/11 of the House and Senate intelligence committees, which was released last summer, revealed that in August 2001 the intelligence community prepared a report for "senior government officials" that said bin Laden wanted to mount attacks in the United States; that al-Qaida had established a presence in the United States; that bin Laden wanted to hijack aircraft; and that information indicated that his supporters were planning strikes in the United States with explosives. The congressional intelligence committees' report strongly hinted that all this information had been in that Aug. 6 PDB, which your administration refused to let the intelligence committees review. Did you accurately characterize the information about al-Qaida that the president received on Aug. 6, 2001? Did the PDB include the information disclosed by the intelligence committees' report? Why would you not let the intelligence committees see the relevant portions of this PDB? Were you concerned that you, the president or the administration might be harmed politically if the contents of this PDB became public?

2) The congressional intelligence committees also reported that in July 2001 an intelligence report warned, "Based on a review of all-source reporting over the last five months, we believe that UBL [Usama bin Laden] will launch a significant terrorist attack against U.S. and/or Israeli interests in the coming weeks. The attack will be spectacular and designed to inflict mass casualties against U.S. facilities or interests. Attack preparations have been made. Attack will occur with little or no warning." The White House refused to let the intelligence committees say whether this warning was presented to the president or you, though committee sources told reporters it had been. Did you and the president receive this warning? If so, how did you or he respond? Did either of you call for any additional action or information? Was this warning included in the Aug. 6 PDB? And did that PDB prompt you or the president to order the national security community to take specific steps? Why did the White House not want the public to know whether you or Bush had seen this warning?